Related Papers
THE OTHER SIDE OF THE MOUNTAIN: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
Аца Ранђеловић
The Journal of Military History
The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan
1999 •
Lester Grau
The Journal of Slavic Military Studies
Securing the Borders of Afghanistan During the Soviet-Afghan War
2015 •
Lester Grau
Journal of Slavic Military Studies
Defeating Guerrilla Logistics: Soviet Operation ‘Trap’ in Western Afghanistan
2018 •
Lester Grau
Asian Affairs, volume 45, issue 1, pp. 112 to 125
Afghan Stalemate: A Comparison of the Soviet and American Counterinsurgencies in Afghanistan
2014 •
Johanna Granville
Regardless of the invading state's aims, ideology, firepower, or population-centric "hearts and minds" strategies, counterinsurgency wars in Afghanistan always seem doomed to fail. The British (1839-1842, 1878-1880), Soviets (1979-1989) and Americans (2001-2013) have all underestimated the difficulties of waging war in this fiercely independent country. The plethora of books published on Afghanistan describing these difficulties fall roughly into four categories: archive-based historical studies, soldiers' war diaries, strategic analyses, and policymakers' memoirs. This article will assess three recently published books by an academic (Artemy Kalinovsky), a US government official (Dov Zakheim), and a US Marine combat veteran (Francis J. West), respectively.
Al-Qaeda versus Najibullah: Revisiting the Role of Foreign Fighters in the Battles of Jalalabad and Khost, 1989–1992
Anne Stenersen
Fighting the Insurgents' War in Afghanistan
Christopher Sims
Military Technology
A Tale of Four Strategies: The War in Afghanistan
2010 •
John Antal
War is usually a complex, multi-sided contest and it is an even more extraordinarily complex to wage successful warfare in Afghanistan. With a resurgent Taliban taking over large areas of Afghanistan in 2007 to 2009, U.S., NATO and Afghan National Army forces have swung into action and are conducting operations in Helmand Province and other areas to deny the area to the Taliban and Al Qaeda and win public support. The area around Kandahar is next and Kandahar 1 is Afghanistan’s second largest city and the spiritual birthplace of the Taliban. The war, now in it’s 9th year, is nowhere near culmination. Most ‘experts” expect decades of fighting yet to come to the war-weary Afghans. The question that is asked by anyone seriously interested in military affairs is how will the war play out in the months and years to come?
Unique features of US-led coalition during the Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, 2001.
Carolina Sclifos
This paper is about to explore one of the most important international operation in Afghanistan, a turnover of global community from unipolar world to a multipolar world, where United States is sharing power with other states and that is about to change the usual course of international relations from the beginning of 21st century. I will argue that intervention in Afghanistan is a typical model of multilateral implication, fact generated a high-level involvement, as well as difficulty in reaching a decision, due to the fact that each states is pursuing its own interests. Also I will argue about terrorism as unifying threat, which can make even ‘enemy’ states to cooperate between them, despite their opposed ideology. In this work I intend to describe that was unique during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, taking into consideration the alliance’s theories and specific features of the coalitions during this intervention. I will stress the main regional and strategic interests of U.S. and Russian Federation, which happened to cooperate during this operation- another individual fact that points the importance of the Operation Enduring Freedom. In conclusion I will argue that the main reason of this coalition was to counter the terrorism which proves the humanitarian concerns, taking into consideration the individual security over state’s security nowadays.
Security science journal
In Afghanistan: Western and Soviet Methods of Counterinsurgency
2021 •
Lasha Tchantouridze
The two-decade-long U.S.-led military mission in Afghanistan ended in August 2021 after a chaotic departure of the NATO troops. Power in Kabul transferred back to the Taliban, the political force the United States and its allies tried to defeat. In its failure to achieve a lasting change, the Western mission in Afghanistan is similar to that of the Soviet Union in the 1980s. These two missions in Afghanistan had many things in common, specifically their unsuccessful counterinsurgency efforts. However, both managed to achieve limited success in their attempts to impose their style of governance on Afghanistan as well. The current study compares and contrasts some of the crucial aspects of counterinsurgency operations conducted by the Soviet and Western forces during their respective missions, such as special forces actions, propaganda activities, and dealing with crucial social issues. Interestingly, when the Soviets withdrew in 1988, they left Afghanistan worse off, but the US-backe...